Tag Archives: La Liga

Tactical Analysis: Arsenal 0-2 Barcelona


Barcelona outclassed Arsenal at the Emirates Stadium to take a huge advantage into the second leg of their UEFA Champions League tie. The Gunners didn’t play poorly and weren’t embarrassed in this match – in fact, they caused the Catalan side plenty of problems – but in the end the better team won quite comfortably and deservedly.

Arsène Wenger didn’t deviate too much from his customary system despite the strength of the opposition, setting up in more or less the habitual 4-2-3-1. Nevertheless, his side did approach the game in a more defensive manner than usual.

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Luis Enrique’s selection was even less surprising, as he stuck with the expected 4-3-3 and fielded his established stars. Marc-André ter Stegen started in goal for this Champions League match, with Claudio Bravo playing in La Liga.

Arsenal started brightly with an aggressive pressing game. Wenger’s men worked hard early on to put pressure on the opposition without the ball. Contrary to what they may be used to, Mesut Özil and Olivier Giroud made perhaps their most important contributions on the defensive end, as the Frenchman dropped back to help the German keep Sergio Busquets on his toes in order to prevent the Spaniard from playing his key role as the pivot, thus disrupting Barça‘s normal passing rhythm. This forced Barcelona to seek other ways of getting the ball from their half to the attacking third.

One option was to try to play out of the back by passing the ball down the flanks. However, the hardworking Alexis Sánchez and Alex Oxlade-Chamberlain hassled Daniel Alves and Jordi Alba, respectively, while Arsenal’s fullbacks played more conservatively than usual to ensure that the Gunners had a spare man by keeping four defenders back to deal with Barcelona’s scintillating front three. Therefore, during the defensive phase of play, the Gunners were essentially organized in a 4-2-4-0, content to cede possession to the Blaugrana‘s center backs as long as the visitors didn’t threaten in more advanced positions.

Another option for Enrique’s side was to try to play long balls forward in an attempt to bypass the first line of pressure. This approach simply didn’t work because of the height advantage that the hosts enjoyed against Barcelona’s attacking players. Per Mertesacker may not be able to match Lionel Messi’s speed on a quick counterattack, but he can feel rather confident in an aerial duel with the Ballon d’Or winner. (See the aerial duels on the diagram above: the English side won nearly every one that took place in its own end of the pitch or in the midfield.)

Finally, the visitors could try to beat Arsenal in the center of the pitch by bringing players back from the front in order to outnumber the opposition in the midfield. Ivan Rakitić and Andrés Iniesta could drop back to help out their fellow midfield, and Messi drifted inside and into deeper positions to provide an additional option. The Argentinian’s movement also dragged Nacho Monreal inside, thus opening up space for Alves to push forward, but Sánchez tracked him diligently to ensure Barcelona didn’t gain an advantage by stretching the Gunners’ defense. This attempt at overloading the middle of the park may have helped Barça retain the ball more easily, but it created problems when the possession did change hands, which happened relatively frequently in the opening stages of the match, when the fresh Arsenal players pressed relentlessly off the ball.

In these moments, the Gunners burst forward explosively. Aaron Ramsey ran up the field from deep, and the home team’s wingers stretched the opposing defense with their pace, while Özil drew the attention of several Barcelona midfield, with Giroud operating as a target man up front. Given the deeper positioning of Enrique’s midfielders, Ramsey’s runs forward were rarely tracked, and the Welshman became a key component of Arsenal’s breaks. (See his shots in the diagram below, which displays the opportunities he had in positions as dangerous as in the penalty area.) The hosts did create chances in this manner but failed to convert them.

However, things  clearly weren’t going entirely as planned for Enrique. His team wasn’t playing poorly but nevertheless occasionally appeared shaky defensively and didn’t seem as clinical as usual going forward. The Spaniard responded with a subtle but crucial adjustment, as Busquets dropped back between Javier Mascherano and Gerard Piqué, operating as a third center back, thus allowing Alba and Alves even more freedom. Perhaps even more importantly, the visitors now had a much easier time passing the ball in their usual way. Özil appeared reluctant to follow Busquets so far up the pitch, presumably in the fear of compromising his team’s defensive shape, so there was less pressure on the center backs when they had the ball. Rakitić and Iniesta could drop back when needed to move the football from deeper positions further up the field, with Messi drifting inside to keep up the number of bodies in the midfield, as the liberty Alves now had to play more aggressively allowed the Brazilian to partially fill the resulting void on the right flank, thus continuing to stretch the opposition.

These changes also had indirect benefits on the defensive end, as Barça lost the football in dangerous positions less often, and the Catalan side’s enhanced ball retention tired the hosts, who spent most of the match defending; as a result, Arsenal’s pressing game and counterattacks became less effective. In fact, the Gunners simply struggled during changeovers in general, so not only were they less threatening on the break, but Barcelona’s counterattacks also became more menacing. When Wenger’s side did commit more players to attacking ventures – which they now had to do to create chances due to this new lack of energy in transition – they seemed slower to react when the possession changed hands and were punished by the sharper visitors, who broke the deadlock through an exquisite counter led by their famous front three. The same three forwards combined once more just minutes later in another break, but Luis Suárez was denied by the post. (Furthermore, Messi found himself unmarked at the end of this move, which can be explained by the change in his positioning: Monreal probably didn’t want to follow him into the midfield because that would have left a gaping hole on the left side of his defense and could have weakened his team’s defensive shape. The Spaniard’s heat map is shown on the left in the diagram below; the Argentinian’s is to the right. Messi also earned the penalty kick he converted shortly thereafter to seal the victory.)

Wenger’s substitutions weren’t stupid but ultimately didn’t have much of an impact on the encounter. On the surface, all three of them seemed to be like-for-like swaps, but to be fair the reality may not have been quite so simple. Theo Walcott, Danny Welbeck, and Mathieu Flamini may play similar roles to those fulfilled from the start by Oxlade-Chamberlain, Giroud, and Francis Coquelin, respectively, but they do offer some different characteristics: (1) Walcott poses a more direct threat to the opposing goal; (2) Welbeck is a hard worker and was obviously fresher than the man he replaced, who himself had been working hard for over an hour, which meant that Arsenal’s pressing game and counterattacks could be at least in part reinvigorated by this change; (3) Flamini is perhaps more combative and defensive than Coquelin, which could allow Ramsey to play a more attacking role and reduce the defensive burden on the Welshman, thus affording him the chance to take a bit of a breather to recover. Nevertheless, these adjustments were simply another case of too little, too late, and Arsenal now faces an uphill battle to remain in the Champions League. (It should be noted that the Blaugrana was so untroubled in the final stages of the match that Enrique didn’t feel the need to make a single substitution.)

This was a fascinating first leg in many respects. For one, we got to witness the Gunners put their potent counterattacking game to the test against stronger opposition, though given the quality of the defending champions it may be unfair to use this particular match as a big indicator of its strength. However, we also learned a lot about what it is that makes Barcelona so successful, in particular regarding Sergio Busquets. The midfielder plays a key role in Barça‘s system, operating as a pivot, so many managers have attempted to focus on closing him down in order to suffocate the Catalan side’s passing options. But all good teams have important players and weaknesses; what makes a good team great is the ability to fight back and address its shortcomings in a constructive manner. In this case, Busquets tweaked his game by dropping back between his two center backs in order to help his side take control of the encounter. Indeed, it is better to be proactive, foresee adversity, and take appropriate action before it even becomes necessary, but things do not always go as planned, especially in football, and this adaptability is therefore a crucial trait of the best teams.

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Filed under Arsène Wenger, Arsenal FC, Barcelona, Champions League, FC Barcelona, football, football tactics, Lionel Messi, Luís Suárez, Sergio Busquets, soccer tactics, Spain football, Spanish football, UEFA Champions League

Tactical Analysis: Celta de Vigo 0-1 Athletic Club


Athletic Club got its chase for a Champions League berth back on track with a hard-fought victory at the Balaídos, simultaneously striking a tough blow to Celta de Vigo’s hopes of achieving the same objective. Los Leones now find themselves just six points off of fourth-placed Villarreal, while Os Célticos dropped out of the top four with this defeat.

Eduardo Berizzo initially set up with a 4-3-3, though the players’ roles were not so clearly defined. Theo Bongonda, usually a forward, started on the left of the midfield trio, with Daniel Wass on the right side of the attacking trident. As a result, Pablo Hernández played a more defensive role in the middle of the park than he may be used to.

Ernesto Valverde, on the other hand, appeared to set up with a front two, as Raúl García seemed more of a second striker playing off of Aritz Aduriz than a traditional attacking midfielder. His role wasn’t particularly rigid, however, and the visitors’ formation did at times resemble a 4-2-3-1.

Athletic took an aggressive approach from the start and never really allowed the hosts to settle. García pushed up to help Aduriz put pressure on Celta’s center backs, while the away team’s wingers did the same to pin back the opposing full backs. Augusto Fernández would therefore have a key role in providing a passing option in order to bypass this wall of pressure, and having three men in the middle of the park – versus Athletic’s two – would have helped.

However, things didn’t pan out that way, both because of the way Celta’s midfielders played and due to the quality of Valverde’s double-pivot. Firstly, Bongonda tended to push forward and drift out to the left flank, which is his typical position. However, none of the front three ever dropped deep enough to compensate in the middle of the park, and, since the full backs had to remain cautious due to the threat posed by the opposing wingers, Athletic rarely appeared stretched in the midfield. (Fabián Orellana’s movement, which suggested he was operating as a central winger, wasn’t particularly helpful; he would probably have stretched the opposition more effectively if he had stayed on the left flank, rather than allowing the Basque side to shift from side to side with him.) Secondly, Beñat Etxebarria and Mikel San José – and, it should be said, the rest of the away side – demonstrated tremendous energy and physicality during the defensive and transitional phases. Ultimately, Los Leones simply outran and outfought the home team. As a result, in the first half Beñat was able to push further forward to keep Fernández on his toes, and Berizzo’s men had trouble playing out of the back. Although Celta held the vast majority of the possession, Athletic was outplaying the hosts from a territorial point of view.

The game therefore became very scrappy, with a lot of wayward passes, breaks in play (due to fouls, the ball going out of play, etc.), interceptions, and long balls, the sort of encounter that better suited the more physical and aggressive Athletic than the more diminutive, technical Celta players. (Velverde’s team, for instance, was dominant in the air, as the diagram above shows.) The pressure that the visitors applied from the front led to several mistakes from the home side and thus chances for Valverde’s men to pounce on. Ultimately, it was an error from a Celta player – specifically, a lapse in concentration from Bongonda, who failed to control the football – that led to the game’s only goal, as the visitors counterattacked quickly, with García running onto Aduriz’s pass and efficiently tucking an accurate shot past the goalkeeper. However, the goal can be explained by other factors, as well.

By the second half, the Athletic players with the most demanding workloads, namely the double-pivot and García, were showing signs of fatigue. Valverde therefore adjusted his tactics in order to keep the pressure on the hosts while still giving his players a chance to recover, tweaking his side’s shape. Iñaki Williams joined García and Aduriz up front to form an attacking trident. Shortly before the hour mark, Iker Muniain replaced Sabin Merino and played to the left of the other two midfielders, dropping deep in order to give his team more bodies in the middle of the park. His technical quality eased the creative burden on Beñat, thus reducing his workload during transitions (since he was no longer asked to run up and down the pitch each time the possession changed hands). This adjustment allowed Beñat and San José to catch their breath and focus more on protecting the back four, which had occasionally been exposed after halftime, as Celta managed to bypass the press imposed by the tiring opposition.

Muniain’s presence in the midfield and the role he played also meant that Athletic more or less matched Celta’s shape, with the substitute mirroring Bongonda’s role, albeit with a slightly more conservative and fluid approach. These similar systems somewhat canceled each other out, which restored the pattern observed in the first half. However, the difference between Muniain’s role and Bongonda’s was ultimately a key one: the former was fresher and could therefore move up and down the pitch more comfortably (see his heat map below), which made him more effective during transitions. This extra energy meant that, in these moments where the ball changed hands, Athletic essentially had three players in the middle of the park, versus Celta’s two. Therefore, they had the upper hand on counterattacks, like the one culminating in García’s winner.

Berizzo’s reaction to the goal was rather uninspiring. He did little other than simply throw on more attacking players in a desperate attempt to grind out a goal out of nowhere, and his changes had little impact on the trend that had developed in this match. Valverde, meanwhile, was content to use his substitutions conservatively, making defensive or like-for-like swaps that – more than anything – simply got fresh legs on the pitch so that Athletic continued to overrun the hosts. Despite the narrow margin of their advantage, Los Leones rarely appeared troubled by Os Célticos and held on for an important victory.

Though not boring, this was not what most football fans would call a pretty match. There were few intricate passing moves or displays of invention and flair. Instead, it was a disjointed affair with a lot of 50-50 balls, tough tackles, stops, and starts. The qualities that shone through in this encounter were not those that make football the beautiful game – technical proficiency, brilliant creativity, and jaw-dropping skill – but rather more old-fashioned traits like grit, determination, athleticism, physicality, and aggression. Such strengths are emphasized less in the modern game than they once were, but this match is a reminder that they remain important and should not be overlooked. After all football is still a contact sport.

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